Visual object tracking (VOT) is one of the most fundamental tasks in computer vision community. State-of-the-art VOT trackers extract positive and negative examples that are used to guide the tracker to distinguish the object from the background. In this paper, we show that this characteristic can be exploited to introduce new threats and hence propose a simple yet effective poison-only backdoor attack. To be specific, we poison a small part of the training data by attaching a predefined trigger pattern to the background region of each video frame, so that the trigger appears almost exclusively in the extracted negative examples. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that reveals the threat of poison-only backdoor attack on VOT trackers. We experimentally show that our backdoor attack can significantly degrade the performance of both two-stream Siamese and one-stream Transformer trackers on the poisoned data while gaining comparable performance with the benign trackers on the clean data.

Previous visual object tracking methods employ image-feature regression models or coordinate autoregression models for bounding box prediction. Image-feature regression methods heavily depend on matching results and do not utilize positional prior, while the autoregressive approach can only be trained using bounding boxes available in the training set, potentially resulting in suboptimal performance during testing with unseen data. Inspired by the diffusion model, denoising learning enhances the model's robustness to unseen data. Therefore, We introduce noise to bounding boxes, generating noisy boxes for training, thus enhancing model robustness on testing data. We propose a new paradigm to formulate the visual object tracking problem as a denoising learning process.

Visual object tracking (VOT) is one of the most fundamental tasks in computer vision community. State-of-the-art VOT trackers extract positive and negative examples that are used to guide the tracker to distinguish the object from the background. In this paper, we show that this characteristic can be exploited to introduce new threats and hence propose a simple yet effective poison-only backdoor attack. To be specific, we poison a small part of the training data by attaching a predefined trigger pattern to the background region of each video frame, so that the trigger appears almost exclusively in the extracted negative examples. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that reveals the threat of poison-only backdoor attack on VOT trackers.

Despite recent advances in the visual tracking community, most studies so far have focused on the observation model. As another important component in the tracking system, the motion model is much less well-explored especially for some extreme scenarios. In this paper, we consider one such scenario in which the camera is mounted on an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or drone. We build a benchmark dataset of high diversity, consisting of 70 videos captured by drone cameras. To address the challenging issue of severe camera motion, we devise simple baselines to model the camera motion by geometric transformation based on background feature points. An extensive comparison of recent state-of-the-art trackers and their motion model variants on our drone tracking dataset validates both the necessity of the dataset and the effectiveness of the proposed methods. Our aim for this work is to lay the foundation for further research in the UAV tracking area.

This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.